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Abstract
We model the organization of the ﬁrm as a type of artiﬁcial neural
network in a duopoly framework. The ﬁrm plays a repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals
to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given
the need for the ﬁrm to learn the environment and its rival’s output.
We show how a ﬁrm’s proﬁt and cooperation rates are aﬀected by its
size, its rival’s size and willingness to cooperate and environmental
complexity.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Information processing and decision making by ﬁrms are not typically done
by one person. Rather decisions are made by a group of people either in a
committee or hierarchical structure. Bounded rationality and/or computa-
tional costs preclude the possibility of any one agent collecting, processing
and deciding about information relevant to the ﬁrm and its proﬁtability.
Thus many agents are employed to process this information so that the ﬁrm
can make informed decisions. But processing information and decision mak-
ing are costly activities. Large ﬁrms, for example, employ hundreds even
thousands of ’managers’ who do not produce or sell anything, but rather
process information and make decisions (Radner, 1993).
Building on previous work (Barr and Saraceno, forthcoming), we model
the ﬁrm as a type of artiﬁcial neural network (ANN) that must make output
decisions in a Cournot duopoly framework. The use of ANNs as a model of
ﬁrm organization allows us to make explicit the nature and cost and beneﬁts
of processing information. Agents within the ﬁrm are required to evaluate
data and communicate this evaluation to others who then make ﬁnal deci-
sions. As discussed in Barr and Saraceno (2002, forthcoming), the beneﬁt
to the ﬁrm of increased resources devoted to information processing (IP) is
better knowledge of the environment and hence increased returns. But the
costs include the costs of paying agents and the time and costs involved with
processing and communicating information.
In Barr and Saraceno (forthcoming) we asked: How does learning aﬀect
a ﬁrm’s ability to produce along the best response function, i.e., the optimal
output a ﬁrm should produce given the decision of its rival? We showed
that ANNs competing in a duopoly setting can learn to converge to the
Nash equilibrium output, which is changing each period due to changing
environmental states. Further we showed environmental complexity aﬀects
both organizational size and proﬁtability. In that setting, ﬁrms choose an
output level given the observation of the environmental state and, after that,
the price is set, the market clears, and ﬁrms then compare their output
choices to the best response they should have played given the output choice
of their opponent.
The ANN embodies the knowledge of the ﬁrm and implicitly contains
a history of what the rival played in the past. Over time, ﬁrms learn to
forecast both the eﬀect of changing environmental states on demand and the
rival’s output; both ﬁrms converge to the Nash equilibrium over time. In
2that framework, we did not consider the possibility of collusion in the sense
that ﬁrms could possibly learn to produce less than Cournot output thus
gaining larger proﬁts.
Here, we are interested in studying the prospects for cooperation with
two additional factors, as compared to traditional cooperation models (see
Axelrod, 1984): (1) the need for ﬁrms to map environmental characteristics
to changing product demand, and (2) many agents within a ﬁrm are needed
to learn not only the environment but what exactly the rival is signalling
about its output strategy, i.e., whether it will cooperate or defect. We argue
that a ﬁrm’s knowledge not only of the environment but also its ability to see
what its rival is doing will ultimately aﬀect its proﬁtability. If, for example,
a ﬁrm learns that its rival has a low desire to cooperate, all else equal,
it too should change its output to defect most of the time. But if a ﬁrm
learns that its rival is willing to cooperate then mutual gains are possible.
The diﬃculty of learning aﬀects a ﬁrm’s ability to cooperate, since in highly
complex environments, ﬁrms will have problems distinguishing what part of
the variation in the market clearing price is coming from the variation in the
environment versus the variation in the rival’s strategy.
In this paper, we have two neural networks competing in a repeated
duopoly setting. Each period, the ﬁrm (network) views an environmental
state vector (an N-length vector of 00s and 10s) which it uses to estimate two
variables: the intercept parameter of the demand curve, and its rival’s output.
The ﬁrm uses the estimate of its rival’s output to decide if its rival is going
to defect or cooperate. If the estimate of its rival’s output is greater than the
shared-monopoly output (plus some margin), the ﬁrm plays the (estimated)
Cournot best response, otherwise it plays the (estimated) shared-monopoly
response. In this sense, both ﬁrms are playing a kind of tit-for-tat strategy:
’I defect if I think you will defect, otherwise I will cooperate.’
After each ﬁrm chooses an output, it observes the market clearing price,
the rival’s output and the true demand intercept. The ﬁrm uses this infor-
mation to calculate the error it made in its estimation of the intercept and
its rival’s output, and then uses this error to improve its performance in the
subsequent periods. Thus the knowledge of both the environmental charac-
teristics and the rival’s past plays lies within the network itself, rather than
any one agent; the network serves as a economical storage device: ’given
what I have learned in the past, I now can map environmental information
to a rival’s output and to the demand intercept.’
3In this paper, we measure environmental complexity by the number of
environmental bits (signals) a ﬁrm views each period. Each period a new
environmental vector is randomly chosen with probability of 1/2N,w h e r eN
is the number of bits in the vector. This is tantamount to what might be
referred to as a ’pure generalization’ process.1 In our paper, for N large
enough, this has the eﬀect of having an environment that is always changing
each period.
In this paper we ask:
• What is the relationship between network size, learning and proﬁtabil-
ity given that ﬁrms are learning both the environment and their oppo-
nent’s behavior?
• How does environmental complexity aﬀect performance, cooperation
and proﬁts?
• What is the relationship between a ﬁrm’s willingness to be ’nice,’ i.e.,
it willingness not to defect given that it estimates its rival will defect,
proﬁts and cooperation.
• What are the best response functions?
• What is the average ﬁrm size in equilibrium versus environmental com-
plexity.
To anticipate some of our results, we will be drawing two sets of conclu-
sions. The ﬁrst is that environmental complexity and ﬁrm dimension interact
in a complex way: performance is a function of the not only the diﬃculty
of the IP task, but also the rival’s size and willingness to cooperate. Sec-
ond, we will show that cooperation rates are also aﬀected by environmental
complexity (more complex environments hamper complexity) and ﬁrm size
(larger ﬁrms tend to be more aggressive).
The rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy review
the literature to which our paper relates. The following (section 3) outlines
1In the computer science literature, the type of ANNs that we employ—the Backward
Propagation Network—normally ’trains’ on a ﬁx e dd a t as e ta n dt h e ni sp r e s e n t e dn e wd a t a
for forecasting (Croall and Mason, 1992). After training the network can ’generalize’ in
the sense that it can make forecasts using new, unseen data. Here, the networks train and
generalize simultaneously.
4the standard Cournot model that we work with, which is an extension of the
RPD game. Next, section 4 discusses the particular game that the neural
networks play and the characterization of the economic environment. In
section 5 we discuss the workings of the particular ANN that we use. Then
sections 6 though 8 present the results of our simulation experiments. Finally,
in section 9 we present concluding remarks and possible research extensions.
2 Related literature
T h e r ei sar i c hl i t e r a t u r eo nt h ei s s u eo fc o o p e r a t i o na n dd e f e c t i o ni nP r i s -
oner’s Dilemma type games, of which the Cournot game is a variant. In this
general framework, two players must make a decision over two outcomes:
whether to cooperate or defect. The result (payoﬀ) of the decision, however,
is aﬀected by the rival’s decision. If decisions have to be made repeatedly and
t h e r ei sl i t t l ep r o s p e c tt h a tt h eg a m ew i l le n di nas h o r tt i m et h e nm u t u a l
sustained cooperation is possible, even if there is no direct communication.
In this vein, ﬁrms can signal their willingness to cooperate over time by
choosing low output over high output. If the other ﬁrm ’takes the bait’ by
also producing a low output, then their is mutual gain to be had (assuming
as u ﬃciently high discount rate).
In terms of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD), a standard game
theoretic result is that of the ’folk theorem,’ which says that if agents are
patient enough, then there are an inﬁnite set of Nash Equilibrium outcomes
that have higher pay-oﬀs than the ’defect every period’ strategy (the so-called
min-max payoﬀ) (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
Recently, models of the RPD have also been concerned with bounded ra-
tionality and the evolution of cooperation. Rubinstein (1986) and Cho (1994)
model agents as boundedly rational automata-type machines. Rubinstein’s
machine is a ﬁnite automata and Cho’s is a simple perceptron. These pa-
pers show the types of equilibria that can arise. If, for example, there is a
bound placed on level of complexity in Rubinstein’s machine then only a ﬁ-
nite number of equilibrium outcomes can be generated. Cho’s machine is able
to ’recover’ the perfect folk theorem using a neural network that maintains
an upper bound on the complexity of equilibrium strategies.
While these papers focus on the nature of the machines and the nature of
the equilibria outcomes, other papers focus on the evolution of cooperation
(Axelrod, 1997; Miller, 1996; Ho, 1996). For example, Miller demonstrates
5how cooperation can evolve overtime if automata machines adapt using a
genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975) that allows the strategic environment to
change. Further he studies co-evolution of strategies under imperfect infor-
mation. Axelrod (1997) also models the RPD with a genetic algorithm, but
ﬁxes the population of possible strategies.
Our paper ﬁts within the literature on adaptive machines that play a re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game but is diﬀerent in the following ways.
First, we are interested in studying an RPD using an agent-based model
of the ﬁrm. Our interest is in asking the questions: How are proﬁts and
cooperation aﬀected by agent-based learning? and what are the optimal
number of agents needed to learn both the external economic environment
and the rival’s output decision over time? For simplicity we hold the ﬁrms’
strategies constant (as a type of Tit for Tat strategy) and focus on the rela-
tionship between ﬁrm complexity (network size), environmental complexity
(the quantity of information), proﬁtability and cooperation. Thus our objec-
tive is to focus not on the evolution of strategies or the types of equilibria
outcomes but rather the learning process that ﬁr m sn e e dt od oi no r d e rt o
improve performance and proﬁts.
In addition to RPD games, cooperation in Cournot models have been
widely discussed (see Tirole (1988) for a review of these models). Similar
to the RPD, collusion is possible if ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient and the
threat of punishment exists (Verboven, 1997). Cyret and DeGroot (1973)
show cooperation is possible if ﬁrms maximize joint proﬁts; further they can
come to cooperate over time by a process of Bayesian learning. Vriend (2000)
presents an adaptive model of a Cournot game, where agents evolve according
to a genetic algorithm. He shows how equilibrium market outcomes can be
diﬀerent depending if agents perform individual rather than social learning.
Our model is similar to these papers in the sense that ﬁrms are adaptive,
but unlike these models ﬁrms’s output decisions evolve based on not only
then rival’s behavior, but also given the nature of the environment and on
the inherent ’niceness’ of ﬁrms themselves.
Our work also ﬁts within the literature on agent-based models of the ﬁrm
(Radner, 1993; DeCanio and Watkins, 1998; Carley, 1996). These models,
borrowing heavily from computer science, represent the ﬁrm as a network of
information processing agents (nodes). In general these papers study which
types of networks minimize the costs of processing and communicating in-
formation. Our model is also agent-based in the sense that we assume that
output decisions by the ﬁrm are made by a network of information process-
6ing agents. However, our work is diﬀerent in two respects: in general, and
unlike other agent-based models, we directly model the relationship between
the external environmental variables, ﬁrm learning and performance; sec-
ondly, we explicitly provide an agent-based model of Cournot competition
and cooperation, which to our knowledge has not been done before.
Our agent-based approach models the ﬁrm as a type of artiﬁcial neural
network, with the nodes representing managers. ANNs are common in com-
puter science and psychology, where they have been used for pattern recog-
nition and modeling of the brain (Croall and Mason, 1992; Skapura, 1996).
In economics, neural networks have been employed less frequently. One ap-
plication has been to use ANNs as non-linear estimation equations (Kuan
and White, 1992). Because of the stochastic and non-linear nature of ANNs
we employ a simulation-based approach to studying the relationship between
ﬁrm performance, competition and size.
3 The duopoly framework
This section will give a textbook summary of standard Cournot theory in a
static and repeated framework. Then, in the next section we will introduce
uncertainty and show how we model ﬁr m sa sA N N s .
Let’s say we have a market with two ﬁrms. Each period they face the
demand function:
pt = αt − β (q1t + q2t).
In section 4 α will be a variable, and we will assume that ﬁrms must estimate
its value from period to period; but for the moment, to review the Cournot
game, we take it as constant and known to the ﬁrms. Here and for the rest
of the paper, we also assume that the slope is constant (and normalized to
1). Proﬁts for each ﬁrm are
πj =[ α − (q1 + q2)]qj − cj,j=1 ,2
where cj is costs, such as the cost of network, and is set to zero for convenience
and without loss of generality.2
2While we do not deny the importance of the cost of carrying a network of a given size,
we do not include this cost in the paper for simplicity since the qualitative results would
not change.




















This is a typical prisoner dilemma’s game. If the two ﬁrms could coor-
dinate their output decisions and act as a monopoly their joint proﬁtf r o m
production would be
π
m =[ α − Q]Q




















Unfortunately in a single shot game the cooperation outcome is not an
equilibrium;3 if one ﬁrm knew that its rival would play half of the monopoly
output, then it could defect by playing its Cournot best response and achieve




















On the other hand, as is well known, if the game is repeated other equi-
librium outcomes can emerge.
3.1 Repeated prisoner dilemmas and the folk theorem
In a repeated framework, ﬁrms face the decision each period wether to ’coop-
erate’ or ’defect’. Then, whether the horizon is ﬁnite or not will yield com-
pletely diﬀerent results. Suppose that the game is repeated inﬁnite times,
3Here we deﬁne cooperation as splitting the monopoly quantity and defection is each
playing best response






where δ is the discount rate.4 In this case many other strategies, involving
cooperation can constitute an equilibrium like the pure best response unco-
operative one. Take for example the grim trigger strategy: cooperate until
the opponent defect, and in case it defects revert to best response forever.













































In words, if the discount rate is large enough, future losses will more than
compensate the short run gain from defection, and cooperation will be the
outcome of a grim trigger strategy. But the same could be showed for the
so called tit-for-tat strategy, consisting in beginning with cooperation, and
playing at each period what the opponent played in the preceding one. In fact
4Notice that δ can either be interpreted as the discount factor of an inﬁnitely repeated
game, or as the probability that the game is repeated after each round when the game
length is undeﬁned. analytically the two ’stories’ boil down to the same thing.
9it can be shown that if the discount rate is high enough, almost any strategy
involving cooperation can be an equilibrium strategy. This is in fact what
the folk theorem tells us: Any feasible expected payoﬀ can be sustained in
an equilibrium as long as each player can expect an equilibrium payoﬀ larger
than the uncooperative one. In that case, no player will have an incentive to
deviate.
With a backward induction argument, on the other hand, it can be shown
that cooperation is not sustainable if the game is repeated a ﬁnite number
of times. Very simply put, if the game is over at time T, the lack of threat
of future retaliation will give the non cooperative outcome at time T. But
then, at time T − 1 the same will hold, because both players will know that
in the future they will not cooperate. This will also be true at time T − 2
and so on, until time 1. Hence with ﬁnite horizons, there is no possibility of
cooperation in a standard Cournot game.
An important extension of the preceding framework, that relates with
the present paper, is the consideration of the eﬀects of uncertainty on the
sustainability of cooperative equilibria.5 This is typically modelled as a price
uncertainty: The constant term of a linear demand function shifts according
to a given probability distribution. The obvious eﬀect of such a feature of the
model is that deviations from the collusive price and proﬁta r en o td i r e c t l y
attributable to the competitor’s unwillingness to cooperate, but may stem
from shifts in the demand function. The punishment scheme designed by a
ﬁrm to force cooperation has as a consequence to be more complex than
in the case of certainty. This typically involves a trade-oﬀ, whose outcome
depends on the particular model adopted: If punishing is too harsh, the ﬁrm
loses possible advantages from collusion with its partner; but if it is too light,
then the opponent may be tempted to adopt a noncooperative stance, and
cheat. To sustain cooperation, hence, ﬁrms have to punish their opponents
only if prices and proﬁts deviate ”too much” from the cooperative level. We’ll
adopt a similar perspective in what follows, with a crucial diﬀerence. We add
the possibility for ﬁrms to reduce uncertainty by means of learning; our focus
in fact is on this learning process, and on how it aﬀects the willingness to
cooperate.
The general result of these models is that the costs of monitoring and
punishing increase with the number of participants, and with the noisiness
of the environment. As a consequence, collusion becomes harder to sustain.
5The seminal work, on this issue is the often cited paper by Green and Porter (1984).
10This section has shortly reviewed some textbook results on repeated pris-
oner dilemma games, that constitute the basis of standard Cournot duopoly
analysis. As we already hinted in the introduction, we modify the basic game
in two respects. The ﬁrst is that we introduce learning, in the sense that the
demand curve shifts from period to period depending on a series of observ-
able environmental variables (αt = f(xt)), and that ﬁrms have to learn what
the functional form f is in order to learn its position. Furthermore the ﬁrms
also have to learn their opponents behavior. The second is that this learning
is costly and depends on the organizational structure of the ﬁrm, that we
will model as a Neural Network.
4A m o d e l o f ﬁrm learning in a repeated Cournot
game
4.1 Strategies
In this paper we have each network employ a relatively simple strategy: a
type of Tit-for-Tat (TFT). The standard TFT says that a ﬁrm should begin
by cooperating and then play the same outcome as the rival’s prior move.
Given our framework, this strategy allows for the possibility of cooperation
once ﬁrms begin to learn the external environment, and learn to separate
the variance in price that is due to environmental change versus their rival’s
output decision.6
The TFT strategy that ﬁrms employ in this paper is a slight variation.
Since ﬁrms estimate both the demand parameter and their rival’s output
quantity each period, they have to use this information to decide whether to
defect or not. More speciﬁcally the ﬁrm chooses an output each period based






















6TFT, in general, behaves according to the four rules of thumb discussed by Axelrod
(1984) for strategies that are likely to promote cooperation in a setting where boundedly
rational agents are the players: (1) Be nice: never be the ﬁrst to defect. (2) Be forgiving:
be willing to return to cooperating even if your opponent defects.(3) Be simple: the easier
it is to discover a pattern in a rival’s output the easier it is to learn to cooperate. (4)
Don’t be envious: don’t ask how well you are doing compared to your rival, but rather
how much better you can do, given your rival’s actions.
11where qj is ﬁrm j0s output, ˆ q
j
−j is ﬁrm j0s estimate of its rival’s output, and
ˆ αj is ﬁrm j0s estimate of α. Equation (1)s a y st h a ti ft h eﬁrm estimates its
rival to be a cheater: ˆ q
j
−j > ˆ αj/4+ρj, i.e., that the rival is expected to
deviate from forecast monopoly proﬁt, then it plays the optimal forecasted
Cournot output; that is, it defects as well.
The threshold value ρj ≥ 0 represents the ﬁrm’s ’willingness to be nice.’
For relatively small values, e.g., ρj =0 , ﬁrm j will play defect relatively
more often; for values ρj ≥ ¨ ρ, the ﬁrm will be so nice that it will never defect.
Notice that in making this decision the ﬁrm has two possible sources of error:
the ﬁrst is the environment, and the second is the opponent’s quantity; this
is why it will allow a deviation ρj from the monopoly output before reverting
to the non cooperative quantity.
4.2 The economic environment
4.2.1 A shifting demand curve
Here we represent the external environment as a vector of binary digits
x ∈{0,1}









xi is the kth element of x. This functional relationship converts a binary digit
vector into its decimal equivalent.7 We can think of this in the following
manner: the vector x contains signals (information) from the environment,
which are arranged in order of increasing importance. α(x) can be thought
of as a weighted sum of the environmental signals. Each period, the ﬁrm
views an environmental vector x and uses this information to estimate the
value of α(x).
4.2.2 Environmental change
Each period an environmental vector is randomly chosen with probability
1/2N. For example, for N =1 0 , each vector has a probability of 0.000977
of being selected. In our simulations it is very unlikely for a for an environ-
mental vector to be viewed by the ﬁrm more than once; the learning process
7The value of α is normalized to be between 0 and 1 by dividing by 1/2N.
12highlights the pattern recognition features of our neural network model of
the ﬁrm.
4.2.3 Complexity
To measure the complexity of the information processing problem, we deﬁne
environmental complexity as the number of bits in the vector, N,w h i c h ,i n
the simulations below, ranges from a minimum of 5 bits to a maximum of
50.
4.3 The steps
Here we outline the behavior of the ﬁrm each period (time subscripts dropped
for notational convenience):
1.E a c hﬁrm observes an environmental state vector x.
2 .B a s e do nt h a te a c hﬁrm estimates a value of the intercept parameter,





−j is ﬁrm j0s guess of ﬁrm −j0s output.
3. Based on the values the ﬁrm estimated in step 2, it makes an output
decision using the TFT-type rule given by equation (1).
4. It then observes the true value of and α, and q−j, a n du s e st h i si n f o r -
mation to determine its errors using the following rules:8






















5. Based on these errors the ﬁrm updates the weight values in its network
for improved performance in the next period. This process is outlined
in the next section.
8In Barr and Saraceno (forthcoming) we demonstrate the how proﬁt and error are
inversely related, and that maximizing proﬁt is the same as minimizing the error. For
the sake of brevity, we do not show a similar result in this paper since the error rule
is relatively more complex, but the same result applies in this case and is conﬁrmed by
regression analysis (results not shown).
135T h e ﬁrm as artiﬁcial neural network
The neural network is comprised of three ’layers’: the environmental data
(i.e., the environmental state vectors), a hidden/managerial layer, and an
output/decision layer. The ’nodes’ in the managerial and decision layers
represent the information processing behavior of agents. Each agent takes
a weighted sum of the information it views and applies a type of squashing
function to produces an output/signal: a value between zero and one. In the
managerial layer, this output is then passed/communicated to the decision
layer. Each output node takes a weighted sum of the signals from the man-
agerial layer to produce a particular decision: an estimated intercept value
or an estimated rival’s output. A graph of the network is shown in Figure 1.
This type of ANN is referred to as a backward propagation network (BPN).
Figure 1: A graph of a neural network.
More speciﬁcally, the environmental data (information) layer is a binary
vector x ∈ X of length N. Each manager (node) in the management (hidden)
layer takes a weighted sum of the data from the data layer. That is, the ith













,i=1 ,...,M j; j =1 ,2.
























Each manager then transforms the inputs via a squashing (voting) function
to produce an output, outh
ij. Here we use one of the most common squash-










Large negative values are squashed to zero, high positive ones are squashed
to one, and values close to zero are ’squashed’ to values close to 0.5.9













































All weights in both layers can take on any real value. Finally, the outputs of




ιj via the sigmoid function,
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We can summarize the behavior of network with two outputs as
































5.1 The learning algorithm
The above process describes the input-output nature of the neural network.
However, the distinguishing feature of the network is its ability to learn.
After the market price is set and the market clears, the ﬁrms learn the true
values of the intercept and rival’s output. They then use this information
9The sigmoid function can represent the votes of managers since the sigmoid is a con-
tinous version of the Heaviside function.
15to help improve their performance in successive periods. They calculate the
error they made and then update the network weights using a gradient decent
method that changes the weights in the opposite direction of the gradient of
the error with respect to the weight values. We begin with a completely
untrained network by selecting random weight values (i.e., we assume the
network begins with no prior knowledge of the environment).
An environmental state vector is realized and the networks processes it, as
described above, to obtain outputs
©




. These outputs are compared
to true values to get an error for each one, according to equations (2) and
(3). Total error is then calculated:
ξj = ε1j + ε2j
This information is then propagated backwards as the weights are ad-
justed according to the learning algorithm, that aims at minimizing the total
error, ξj.D e ﬁne ˆ yj =
©




and yj = {α, q−j}. The gradient of ξj with


























ˆ yιj(1 − ˆ yιj).



























where i =1 ,...,Mj; ι =1 ,2; j =1 ,2; k =1 ,...,N.
O n c et h eg r a d i e n t sa r ec a l c u l a t e d ,t h ew e i g h t sa r ea d j u s t e das m a l la m o u n t
in the opposite (negative) direction of the gradient. We introduce a propor-
tionality constant η, the learning-rate parameter, to smooth the updating
process. If we deﬁne δ
o
ιj = .5(yιj − ˆ yιj)g0(ino
ιj), we have the weight adjust-
























iιj. When the updating of weights is ﬁnished, the
ﬁrm views the next input pattern and repeats the weight-update process.
166 Organization, learning and cooperation: a
simulation experiment
In this section we present the results of a simulation experiment. The steps
of the experiment were outlined in sections 4 and 5 above. We are mainly
interested in two diﬀerent issues: The ﬁrst is whether the two ﬁrms learn,
i.e., if in the long run they are able to map signals from the environment to
demand conditions and the opponent’s. The second is how the environmental
complexity that ﬁrms face, especially in the ﬁrst stages of their interaction,
aﬀects their decision to cooperate or defect as well as their proﬁtability. For
each set of parameter values, we rerun the simulation 50 times and take
average values in order to smooth out ﬂuctuations.
In this section we show some particular runs of the model that are repre-
sentative of its features. The robustness of these results will then be veriﬁed
in section 7 by means of an econometric investigation over the parameter
space. Here we ﬁx many of the variables and look only at one particular
outcome.
6.1 Error
The ﬁrst question is: Can ﬁrms learn both the relationship between the envi-
ronment and demand and learn to forecast the rival’s output decision, given
the complexity level of the environment? Below, in Figure 2, we show the
results of one ﬁrm for two networks each with 8 nodes in the hidden layer,
T =2 5 0iterations, N =1 0 , and ρj =0 .05 (j =1 ,2).10 We show the sepa-
rate errors to see that both converge to zero over the long run. We can see
that the network is able to improve its forecasts over time. Interestingly, the
estimation of the rival’s output has a lower error than the estimation of the
intercept values.
6.2 Proﬁta n dc o o p e r a t i o n
Once we made sure the networks learn, we next see how proﬁta n dc o o p e r -
ation evolve. Below, in Figure 3, we can see how proﬁts increase over time.
We show proﬁts for two diﬀerent ’niceness’ values, ρj =0and ρj =0 .05
(j =1 ,2) (i.e., both ﬁrms play the game with the same niceness parameter).













































Figure 2: Firm 1 average errors of network over time.
We present the results only for ﬁrm 1 since the two ﬁrms are symmetric. In
t h ec a s eo fρj =0ﬁrms are less willing to cooperate, all else equal. This
results in lower proﬁts for the ﬁrm. When ρi =0 .05 proﬁts are relatively
higher. Notice, however, that the relative increase in proﬁts due to increased
cooperation is not that large. This is due to the fact that since the error is
much greater for α, added cooperation only increases proﬁts by a little bit.
(Cesco if you don’t like this new graph then the only
think i can suggest is that we replace the graph with
only moving averages)
In Figure 4 we show how average cooperation rates for ﬁrm 1 change over








Then over 50 runs we take the average cooperation rate for each period as
¯ c1t = 1
50
P50
r=1 c1rt a n dt h i si sw h a tw ep l o tv e r s u st i m ei nﬁgure 4. Notice
that if ρj =0 , the cooperation rates steadily decrease over time. This is due
to the fact that the ﬁrm continues to make errors in estimating its rival’s
output and thus is more likely to defect over time. While if the ﬁrm has a






















Figure 4: Firm 1 cooperation rates for diﬀerent ’niceness’ values.
6.3 Proﬁts and cooperation versus complexity
Here we look at average proﬁts and average cooperation rates as a function
of increasing complexity (M1 = M2 =8 , ρ1 = ρ2 =0 .05).W es e et h a tt h e
more information to process (i.e., the greater environmental complexity) the
lower is proﬁts and average cooperation. This ﬁnding implies that all else
19equal, the prospects for sustained cooperation is diminished in environments






































Figure 5: Firm 1 average proﬁts and cooperation rates versus environmental
complexity.
6.4 Cooperation versus ’niceness’
The above results are given for symmetric ﬁrms. Here we ask the question:
What does changing the ’niceness’ value for ﬁrm 1 do to cooperation rates
and proﬁts, holding ﬁrm two’s niceness parameter constant? Figures 6 and
7 show the results. Here we see that if ﬁrm 1 increases its niceness but ﬁrm
two holds its value constant (where ρ2 =0 ) then increased niceness does
not pay. Notice, in ﬁgure 6, that from a value of about ρ =0 .25, ﬁrm 1
cooperates almost all the time. The threshold is large enough that defection
by the opponent never triggers a non cooperative response. This is why, in
section 7, we will focus on a subsample, with ρ ∈ [0,0.25].
While ﬁrm two also increases its cooperation rate it does not do so at the
same rate as ﬁrm one. Interestingly ﬁrm one experiences a negligible drop
in proﬁts, while ﬁrm two’s proﬁts increase due to its ’defection advantage’
compared to ﬁrm 1.
In summary, the results of this section show that neural networks com-
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Cooperation Rates vs. Firm 1's Cooperation Parameter
Figure 6: Average cooperation rates for ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 versus ﬁrm 1’s
niceness value.
the rival’s output decisions. This learning results in increased proﬁto v e r
time, but the level of proﬁtt h a tt h et w oﬁrms can achieve is a function of
their willingness to cooperate. The ’nicer’ they are the more they can achieve
mutual gains to cooperation. But if their niceness threshold is relatively low,
they are less likely to cooperate. This is due to the fact that since the envi-
ronment state changes each period, ﬁrms will have some error in estimating
the demand function, thus they will always have diﬃculty estimating the
rival’s true output and this will make ﬁrms more likely to defect. Finally, in-
creasing environmental complexity is associated with lower proﬁts and lower
cooperation rates.
7R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s
In our model proﬁts and cooperation choices depend on a number of variables,
that interact at diﬀerent levels (environment, ﬁrm complexity, interaction
between ﬁrms). This is why, after using particular runs to show interesting
results of our setup, we need to check for the robustness of our ﬁndings. This
section will apply standard econometric techniques to a data set generated
by our model by random draws of the most interesting parameters. Each
observation (we had 4500 of them) consists of the parameters, and of the
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Table 1 reports the parameter ranges. A ﬁrst look at the correlation coef-
Variable M1,M 2 NTρ 1,ρ 2
Min 25 5 0 0
Max 25 60 500 .25
Table 1: Range of explanatory variables. Note: ρj =ˆ αj/rj,j=1 ,2.
ﬁcients (Table 2) of our data set can give us some information.11 {UP-
DATE} This rough picture tells us that something interesting. First,
as expected, more complex environments (higher number of inputs) yield, in
general, lower proﬁt. But, and on this we had no prior, they
appear to aﬀect the cooperation rate. Table 2 also tells us
that if player 1 has a greater willingness to cooperate then it will have lower
proﬁts; an increased willingness of player 2 to cooperate will increase player
11Notice that we only focus on ﬁrm 1. Firm two is symmetric, so that analyzing it would
yield the same results.
22Π1 C1 M1 M2 NTρ 1 ρ2
Π1 1
(−)( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
C1 1
(−)( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
Table 2: Correlation coeﬃcients (t-stats below estimates; signiﬁcant values
in bold).
one’s proﬁts. Increasing the number of iterations has strong eﬀects on proﬁts,
while the eﬀects on cooperation are modest (even if signiﬁcant).
Finally, organizational complexity seems to have a
positive eﬀect on own proﬁts (and a negative one on
the opponent’s), but the low value of the coeﬃcient,
and our own priors suggest to wait before drawing a
conclusion.
The next step is to look more thoroughly into these relationships. To do
this we ran some regressions; the results for proﬁt are reported in Table 3.






























M1 · T 0.05
(37.25)
M1 · N 0.49
(43.26)
M2 · r1 0.03
(2.75)
T · N −0.03
(−42.43)





Number of obs: 4500
Table 3: Regression results for the dependent variable 10,000 ∗ Π1. Non
signiﬁcant variables have been omitted.
We can give a summary of the results of the regressions in regards to
proﬁts:
23• The regression conﬁrms the humped-shaped relationship between ﬁrm
dimension and proﬁts, cet. par. This result is robust as we’ve also
found it in our other papers under diﬀerent circumstances.
• The relatiohship between proﬁt and environmental complexity is lin-
early negative.
• Cet. par. increasing time increases proﬁts since it lowers the ﬁrm’s
error.
• The relationship between proﬁt and willingness to cooperate is negative
and non-linear. Holding constant ﬁrm 2’s willingness to cooperate, if
ﬁrm 1 increases its willingness to cooperate, it putts itself in the classic
prisoner’s dilemma situation: if the rival defects then cooperation will
yield a lower pay-oﬀ.
Before proceeding, we can draw a ﬁrst conclusion: Our model conﬁrms
previous ﬁndings (Barr and Saraceno; 2002, forthcoming) on the relationship
between ﬁrm proﬁtability, size and the environment it faces; speciﬁcally,
e n v i r o n m e n t a lc o m p l e x i t yn e g a t i v e l ya ﬀects proﬁts, and the trade-oﬀ relative
to ﬁrm size, between speed and accuracy emerges in this setting as well, giving
a hump shape relationship between ﬁrm size and proﬁt. We also showed that
more cooperative ﬁrms have higher proﬁts.
We now turn to the other dependent variable, the one speciﬁct ot h i s
paper: the degree of cooperation; the results of the regression are reported
in Table 4.
The regressions yield the following results:
• As expected, the willingness to cooperate by any of the two ﬁrms,
increases the cooperation rate over the relevant range of ρ1 and ρ2.
• Also expected is the negative relationship
between environmental complexity (N) and
degree of cooperation. In a more complex
environment, uncertainty makes it harder
for a ﬁrm to detect defection, by the oppo-
nent, who has thus less incentive to coop-
erate.






























M2 · T 0.03
(5.97)
M2 · N −0.65
(−13.39)
T · r1 −0.09
(−37.7)
r1 · r2 0.05
(2.51)





Number of obs: 4500
Table 4: Regression results for the dependent variable 10,000 ∗ C1. Non
signiﬁcant variables have been omitted
• Amore interesting picture relates the coop-
eration rate with ﬁrm dimension. We can
see that larger ﬁrms tend to cooperate less,
and to induce the opponents to cooperate
more. Said diﬀerently, a ﬁrm is more likely
to cooperate if it is small and if it faces
a large competitor. This also tells us that
the cooperation rates of the two ﬁrms will
tend to be approximately equal if they are
of similar sizes, but that they will diverge
when size diverges.
To summarize, our regressions substantially
conﬁrm the robustness of the results of section
6: cooperation is hampered by more complex
environments, and of course by lower ”nice-
ness,” or willingness to cooperate. In addition,
25our regression analysis sheds light on the rela-
tionship between ﬁrms size and cooperation,
drawing the conclusion that ”big is aggres-
sive.”
8 Equilibria
Up till now, we’ve explored the relationship between complexity and niceness
on ﬁrm proﬁts and cooperation rates. In this section we focus on the likely
outcomes of ﬁrm size in the Cournot competition framework. The two ﬁrms
are strategic rivals in three diﬀerent senses: a rival’s choice of output, network
size and niceness all aﬀect the ﬁrm’s pay-oﬀs.
In this section we further explore this relationship by studying the rival’s
choice of ﬁrm size and cooperation on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. First we explore
network size equilibrium, the we explore a niceness equilibrium:
8.1 To be explore










Thus the best response functions are fairly complicated.....
8.2 Network Size Equilibria
Here we explore the concept of equilibrium with regards to network size,
which we call a network size equilibrium (NSE). We deﬁne an NSE as a
pair of M0s such that neither ﬁrm has an incentive to change the number of
managers. That is to say, in an equilibrium, each network, given the number
of agents (nodes) of its rival, ﬁnds that switching to another number of agents


























The regression results in section 7 showed that a rival’s network size
aﬀects the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm. Thus if a rival changes its network size,
it will alter the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and it too may want to alter its ﬁrm size to
improve its proﬁtability. Further we see that cooperation rates are aﬀected
by a rival’s choice of network size.
In this section we ask: What is the relationship between environmental
complexity, network size and cooperation rates at equilibrium? We focus on
the equilibria that exist after T periods, and do not have endogenous dynam-
ics with the number of managers, i.e., we do not examine ﬁrms changing the
number of managers during the learning process. Rather we conduct a kind
of comparative statics exercise, whereby we look at the NSE that arise for
given environmental conditions.
In this experiment, we have networks of diﬀerent sizes compete for T =
250 iterations (for each pair of M0s and input numbers we take 50 runs and
take averages to smooth out ﬂuctuations in each run). That is to say, ﬁrm
one and two compete against each other for each size, M1,M 2 ∈ {2,...,20},
and ρj = .05. We repeat this competition for N =5 ,10,...,50.
For each complexity value we calculated the NSEs that emerge (for each
number of inputs there were always more than one equilibrium) and then
added the total number of managers of the two ﬁrms for each equilibrium to
obtain an ‘equilibrium industry size.’ This gave us a data set of 53 NSEs (for
an average of 5.3 per complexity level). Figure 8 shows the results, where we
plot average ’industry size’ and average cooperation rates (the average of the
cooperate rates for the two ﬁrms) for each complexity level. As we can see
average industry size is increasing in complexity, while average cooperation
is decreasing.
8.3 Niceness and Firm Size
9C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented a model of ﬁrm learning and cooperation. We inves-
tigate the prospects for cooperation given an agent-based model of the ﬁrm








































Figure 8: Avg. ’industry’ size and avg. cooperation rates versus environ-
mental complexity
rival’s output decision. We demonstrate that increased environmental com-
plexity is associated with lower rates of cooperation and lower proﬁtability.
We show that in complex environments frequent cooperation is more sus-
tainable when ﬁrms are more willing to be ’nice’ in the sense that ﬁrms are
less likely to defect if they estimate their rival will defect. Further we show
that ﬁrm size has an eﬀect on both proﬁts and cooperation. Increasing ﬁrm
size, holding the rival’s ﬁrm constant, increases proﬁts up to a point and
then proﬁts decrease. This trade-oﬀ is due to the fact that adding agents
improves accuracy greater than the loss of speed in learning, up to a point.
Increasing ﬁrm size, ceteris paribus, has an interesting eﬀect on cooperation:
w es e ead e c l i n ei nt h eﬁrm’s cooperation as it increases its size; yet we see
that it has a positive eﬀect on the willingness of the rival to cooperate. Fi-
nally, we have shown that given our deﬁnition of network size equilibrium,
increasing complexity is associated with larger average ﬁrm size and lower
average cooperation rates in equilibrium.
This paper leads to several possible research extensions. First we can
explore the prospects for cooperation given that ﬁrms play diﬀerent strategies
than just the Tit-For-Tat type employed here. Also we can explore the
evolution of cooperation given that ﬁrms can switch strategies over time.
28F u r t h e rw ec a ns e eh o wt h ec o m p o s i t i o no ft h en e t w o r ka ﬀects learning and
cooperation. For example, we can study how the networks behave when they
have more than one hidden layer or when information to agents is restricted,
in order to model specialization.
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